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Vol.2 , No. 1, Publication Date: Jun. 6, 2019, Page: 6-15
 forces to General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) on July 14, 1950. The delegation of operation control (OPCON) enabled the UNC to wage war under the unity of command and interdict the expansion of communism, as well as protect liberal democracy and the ROK’s territory. Lessons from the Korean War are meaningful. If the ROK did not take the lead in waging war and could not exercise operational control over its forces, we can assume that there would have been conflict between the ROK government’s war objective and the UNC’s war objective. The ROK government pursued an independent, liberal democratic unified Korea by seizing the Yalu River as its consistent war objective. However, the UNC pursued inconsistent war objectives, such as the recovery of the 38th parallel, the establishment of a liberal unified government, honorable withdrawal, and the end of the Korean War by truce. The Koreanization of the ROK defense is natural. This will take place through the complete transition of operational control along with the great growth of the ROK’s national power, as well as the evolution of the ROK-US alliance. The transition of wartime operational control can be achieved by the ROK’s vision, strategy, capabilities and national will. The moment the OPCON transition comes into being as of Jan 1, 2021 as planned, the ROK will stand up to cope with the North Korean threat.&picture=http://www.aascit.org/aascit/decorators/img/journal/931.jpg)
| [1] | Chung Kyung-young, Department of Korean Studies, Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University, Seoul, Republic of Korea. |
During the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee delegated his command authority over the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces to General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) on July 14, 1950. The delegation of operation control (OPCON) enabled the UNC to wage war under the unity of command and interdict the expansion of communism, as well as protect liberal democracy and the ROK’s territory. Lessons from the Korean War are meaningful. If the ROK did not take the lead in waging war and could not exercise operational control over its forces, we can assume that there would have been conflict between the ROK government’s war objective and the UNC’s war objective. The ROK government pursued an independent, liberal democratic unified Korea by seizing the Yalu River as its consistent war objective. However, the UNC pursued inconsistent war objectives, such as the recovery of the 38th parallel, the establishment of a liberal unified government, honorable withdrawal, and the end of the Korean War by truce. The Koreanization of the ROK defense is natural. This will take place through the complete transition of operational control along with the great growth of the ROK’s national power, as well as the evolution of the ROK-US alliance. The transition of wartime operational control can be achieved by the ROK’s vision, strategy, capabilities and national will. The moment the OPCON transition comes into being as of Jan 1, 2021 as planned, the ROK will stand up to cope with the North Korean threat.
Keywords
The Korean War, Operational Control, United Nations Command, The Transition of Wartime Operational Control, Vision and Strategy, A Peace Regime, A Democratic Unified Korea
Reference
| [01] | President Syngman Rhee graduated from George Washington University, Graduate School from Harvard University and received his PhD entitled “Neutrality influenced by the United States” from Princeton University in 1910. |
| [02] | Dr. Syngman Rhee broadcasted his independent state initiative in Feb 1946. The South Korea Democratic Association adopted his state initiative on Mar 15, 1946. The 1948 ROK Constitution included President Rhee’s 27 point agenda. |
| [03] | Syngman Rhee, ed. Park Ki-bong, Independence Spirit (Seoul: Bibong Publishing Co., 2018), pp. 33-34. |
| [04] | Chung Kyung-young, “President Syngman Rhee and Operational Control,” youtube, https://search.naver.com/search.naver?where=nexearch&sm=top_hty&fbm=0&ie=utf8&quer y=%EC%A0%95%EA%B2%B D%EC%98%81. |
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| [06] | Institute for Military History, MND, Compiles of National Defense Treaties I (Seoul: ROK MND, 1981): “I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas.” |
| [07] | Chung ll-kwon, Reminiscence (Seoul, Korea Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 169-171. |
| [08] | Chung, Kyung-young, “An Analysis of ROK-U.S. Military Command Relations from the Korean War to the Seoul Olympic Games," Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, June, 1989, pp. 42-46. |
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| [16] | Chung, Kyung-young, “An Analysis of ROK-U.S. Military Command Relations from the Korean War to the Seoul Olympic Games," Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, June, 1989. |
| [17] | HQs, Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, D. C.: DoA, Feb 2008), p. Glossary-11: Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. |
| [18] | Institute for Military History, The History of the ROK-US Alliance 1953-2013 (Seoul: IMH, Ministry of National Defense, 2014), p. 414. |
| [19] | Joint Communique,” First Annual US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, May 28, 1968 in Washington, D. C. |
| [20] | Ministry of National Defense, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow of Yoolgok Project (Seoul: Office for Warfighting Planning, 1994), p. 22 |
| [21] | Institute for Military History, The History of the ROK-US Alliance 1953-2013 (Seoul: IMH, Ministry of National Defense, 2014), p. 173. |
| [22] | Pyun Jae-pil, “Transfer of Wartime Republic of Korea Command Authority,” US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2005; Chung Kyung-young, “An Analysis of ROK-US Military Command Relations,” US Army Command & General Staff College MMAS Thesis, 1989. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211800.pdf. |
| [23] | “Complete Transfer of Ten Military Mission from US Forces to ROK Forces,” Yonhap News, Sep 25, 2008. |
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| [28] | North Korea committed 3,094 provocation including 1,977 infiltrations such as guerrilla and military provocations such as the sinking of the warship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyong Island: The ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2016 White Defense Paper (Seoul: MND Publishing, 2016), pp. 251-252. |
| [29] | Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopp, 2014), p. 497: North Korea’s sinking of its warship Cheon the previous March had produced a change in attitude in South Korea, and there were demands for retaliation against shelling. South Korea’s original plans for retaliation were disproportionately aggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery. We were worried the exchanges could escalate dangerously. the President, Hillary Clinton Secretary of State, General Mullen Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff and Robert Gates were all on the phone often with South Korean counterparts over a period of days. |
| [30] | Carl von Clausewitz, eds., and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). |
| [31] | Chung Kyung-young, “Building A Military Security Cooperation Regime in Northeast Asia: Feasibility and Design,” PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland, 2005, p. 347. |
| [32] | General Vincent K. Brooks, “USFK Commander’s Testimony before U.S. House Armed Forces Committee,” Mar 14, 2018. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media /doc/Brooks_03-15-18.pdf, (Accessed: Sep 27, 2018). |
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| [34] | Interview with former CFC commanders and US ambassadors to Korea, policy-makers and security experts during author’s visit to the US (Dec 12-Dec 14, 2016/June 13-June 17, 2017) and American experts’ visit to Seoul in 2018. |
| [35] | Baek Min-jung, “Analysis of US Security Experts’ Perception related to the Transition of Wartime OPCON and Implications,” Weekly Defense Forum, Korea Institute of Defense Analysis, Nov 1647 (16-50), Nov 28, 2016. |
